Instinctive Foundations
Instinct?
Instinct is often sidelined in modern educational and cultural discourse. Within psychological and behavioural paradigms, especially those influenced by behaviourism or neoliberal performance metrics, human development is typically framed in terms of conscious choice, discipline, and environmental control. As Toates (2009) notes, instinct has at times been treated as a vague or outdated concept, associated with “primitive” drives rather than intelligent behaviour. Freud’s (1915) model of civilisation, for instance, positions instinct (Trieb) as something to be repressed in order to maintain social order, a framing that continues to echo in pedagogical systems where stillness, silence, and obedience are prioritised over movement, spontaneity, or self-direction.
Yet across disciplines from ethology and neuroscience to ecological psychology and embodied cognition instinct has consistently been recognised as a fundamental form of biological intelligence. In this project, instinct is not understood as a base animal impulse, but as an evolved capacity to recognise, seek, and respond to the conditions necessary for health and flourishing (Varela et al., 1991; Panksepp, 1998; Wilson, 1984).
In biological terms, instinct refers to inherited, species-typical behaviours that emerge without the need for explicit instruction. Konrad Lorenz (1935) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (1951) famously described such behaviours as fixed action patterns: sequences that are triggered by specific environmental stimuli and unfold predictably. Examples include geese retrieving displaced eggs, salmon returning to their birth streams, or birds instinctively feeding their young. These behaviours are not learned through culture; they are embedded responses to environmental conditions and survival needs (Tinbergen, 1963).
Figure 1. Fixed action pattern in greylag goose: the instinctive egg-rolling movement studied by Lorenz and Tinbergen (1938).
Source: Kimchi, T. (2012). *Behavioral Neuroscience: Introduct
Source: Let’s Go Chipper. (2013, January 3). *Chipper Events – Salmon Spawning Season*. https://letsgochipper.wordpress.com/2013/01/03/chipper-events-salmon-spawning-season/
Source: iStock. (n.d.). *Robin Feeding Her Young* [Photograph]. iStock by Getty Images. https://www.istockphoto.com/photos/bird-feeding-chicks
Human beings are no exception. Newborns exhibit reflexes like rooting, sucking, and face-tracking. Toddlers instinctively mirror expressions, seek proximity to caregivers, and engage in rhythmic play (Bowlby, 1969; Gopnik et al., 1999). Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp (1998) identified a set of primary emotional systems, including seeking, care, play and panic, which are hardwired into mammalian brains and serve as the motivational infrastructure for behaviour. These systems are not products of rational thought; they guide organisms toward attachment, curiosity, movement and safety. When suppressed or dysregulated, such as through overstimulation, social disconnection or lack of physical freedom developmental and emotional difficulties can emerge.
One of the most well-known and misunderstood cases in the history of behavioural science is that of Clever Hans (Pfungst, 1911), the early 20th-century horse who appeared to perform arithmetic by tapping his hoof. At first hailed as a mathematical prodigy, Hans was later shown not to “know” the answers, but to respond with incredible sensitivity to unconscious human cues; posture, breath, and eye movement. Rather than proving animal stupidity, the Hans case reveals something deeper: that instinctive perception is not primitive, but extraordinarily attuned to context. As Varela et al. (1991) argue, cognition emerges not from internal logic alone but from the body’s dynamic relationship with its environment. Hans was not solving equations, but reading the world, something many children are discouraged from doing when learning is reduced to abstract, disembodied tasks. The Clever Hans case thus mirrors the broader cultural discomfort with forms of intelligence that cannot be easily measured, rationalised, or standardised, instincts, perceptions, and intuitions that are often dismissed despite their evolutionary function.
This idea is echoed in theories of embodied cognition, which propose that cognition itself arises not from detached reasoning but from the interaction between body, brain, and world. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) argue that perception is enactive we make sense of the world through bodily interaction with it. Similarly, Gibson’s (1979) affordance theory, expanded by Heft (2010), suggests that we perceive environments in terms of action possibilities. A log is not just wood it is something to climb, balance on, rest against. In this view, instinct is not irrational, but situated intelligence perception primed for movement and meaning.
Children are biologically primed to learn through movement, rhythm, mess, social interaction, and curiosity (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019). Yet formal schooling often teaches them to suppress these impulses to sit still, be quiet, avoid touch, and tolerate sensory deprivation. As Foucault (1977) argues, institutions like schools enact a form of bodily discipline that suppresses instinctive forms of life. For neurodivergent children, this suppression can be especially acute. Behaviours that might reflect sensory needs, emotional regulation, or exploratory instincts are often labelled disruptive or pathological (Kapp et al., 2013; Shulman, 2020).
From an ecological perspective, instinct also encompasses our drive to connect with nature. Wilson’s (1984) Biophilia Hypothesis proposes that humans have an innate affinity for life and life-like systems. This is supported by empirical research showing that exposure to green space improves mood, attention, empathy, and physiological regulation (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989; Gatersleben, 2008; Soga & Gaston, 2020). These are not abstract preferences, but evolved tendencies toward environments that support flourishing.
At its core, this project recognises that humans are animals. We are shaped by the same evolutionary pressures as other mammals, and we carry the same biological wisdom. The capacity of a bird to build a nest, or a fox to shelter from rain, is not taught it is enacted when the environment affords it. Human instincts for rest, movement, relational contact, exploration, creativity, and stillness function in much the same way. They are not arbitrary. They are guides.
Definiting Instinct
Instinct, in this Capstone, is defined as the biologically embedded capacity of human beings to recognise, seek, and respond to the conditions that support health and flourishing—including movement, rest, relationship, exploration, and connection with nature.
These capacities are evolutionarily shaped (Wilson, 1984; Tinbergen, 1963), neurologically grounded (Panksepp, 1998; Varela et al., 1991), and expressed through the body long before they are formalised in language, culture, or education (Gopnik et al., 1999; Shapiro & Stolz, 2019; Heft, 2010).
This understanding rejects the framing of instinct as irrational or outdated. Instead, it positions instinct as a foundational and intelligent force, one that when honoured, can guide the redesign of systems that have long worked against it.
References
Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A.N. and Kuhl, P.K., 1999. The scientist in the crib: Minds, brains, and how children learn. William Morrow & Co.
Heft, H., 2010. Affordances and the perception of landscape. Innovative approaches to researching landscape and health open space: People space, 2.
iStock (n.d.) Robin Feeding Her Young [Photograph]. iStock by Getty Images. Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photos/bird-feeding-chicks (Accessed: 28 July 2025).
Kaplan, R. and Kaplan, S., 1989. The experience of nature: A psychological perspective. Cambridge university press.
Kimchi, T. (2012) Behavioral Neuroscience: Introduction to Animal Behavior [Lecture slides]. Weizmann Institute of Science.
Let’s Go Chipper (2013) Chipper Events – Salmon Spawning Season. Let’s Go Chipper Blog. Available at: https://letsgochipper.wordpress.com/2013/01/03/chipper-events-salmon-spawning-season/ (Accessed: 28 July 2025).
Panksepp, J., 2004. Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. Oxford university press.
Pfungst, O., 1911. Clever Hans:(the horse of Mr. Von Osten.) a contribution to experimental animal and human psychology. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schwidder, W., 1969. Attachment and Loss. Volume I Attachment.
Shapiro, L. and Stolz, S.A., 2019. Embodied cognition and its significance for education. Theory and Research in Education, 17(1), pp.19-39.
Soga, M. and Gaston, K.J., 2020. Extinction of experience: The need to be more specific. People and Nature, 2(3), pp.575-581.
Tinbergen, N., 1963. On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift für tierpsychologie, 20(4), pp.410-433.
Varela Francisco, J., Evan, T. and Eleanor, R., 1991. The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience.
Wilson, E.O., 1986. Biophilia. Harvard university press.